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Abstract: Violations of social norms can be costly to society and they
are, in the case of large crimes, followed by prosecution. Minor misbehav-
iors — small crimes — do not usually result in legal proceedings. Although
the economic consequences of a single small crime can be low, such crimes
generate substantial losses in the aggregate.
In this paper we measure perceptions of incorrect behavior or ‘small
crime’, based on a questionnaire administered to a large representative sam-
ple from the Dutch population. In the questionnaire we ask the respondents
to rate the severity and justiﬁability of a number of small crimes. We present
short questions that only state the nature of the small crime, as well as vi-
gnette questions, describing in detail the ﬁctitious person committing the
small crime and other factors related to the circumstances in which the small
crime is committed.
We ﬁnd that the perceived severity of small crimes varies systematically
with characteristics of the respondent as well as of the person committing the
crime. Small crimes are considered less serious if committed by someone with
lower income. Also, the association between respondent characteristics and
perceived seriousness changes if the respondents are given more information
about the oﬀender and the circumstances of the oﬀense.
JEL Classiﬁcation: K42, K14
Keywords: Crime seriousness, Social norms, Vignettes
2Prelude
In Odessa around 1896, a 15-year old boy carried a message to the writer
Mr. Lilienblum, who also served as treasurer of the local ‘Lovers of Zion’.
While the boy was waiting for Lilienblum to write a reply, he took out his
cigarettes and reached for the ashtray and matchbox on the drawing room
table. Mr Lilienblum quickly put his hand on the boy’s to stop him,
‘then went out of the room and returned a moment later with an-
other matchbox that he had brought from the kitchen, explaining
that the matches on the drawing room table had been bought out
of the budget of the Lovers of Zion, and were to be used only at
committee meetings, and then only by members of the commit-
tee.’ (Oz, 2003, pp. 88–89)
The boy was Alexander Klausner, brother of the famous scholar Joseph
Klausner, and grandfather of Amos Oz, the Israeli author.
A young boy goes to supermarket and sees an expensive pen which he likes
a lot. He puts the pen in his pocket and walks out of the shop, but the shop
assistant has seen him, grabs him, and hands him over to the police. At the
police station, the boy’s father is called and appears.
Father: Son, why did you do this?
Boy: I liked the pen so much!
Father: But you know you should not steal.
Boy: I liked the pen so much!
Father: Why did you not tell me? I could have brought one for
you from the oﬃce.
1 Introduction
Living together in a society is guided by formal and informal rules. Vio-
lations of these rules can be costly to society and they are, in the case of
large crimes, followed by prosecution. Minor misbehaviors — small crimes
— do not usually result in legal proceedings, because the cost of enforcing
compensation of small crimes would be too high or because the law does not
permit prosecution. Although the economic consequences of a single small
crime will be low, such crimes are often quite common and can, in the aggre-
gate, generate substantial losses. In the year 2000, for example, surﬁng the
Internet at work for private use was estimated to cost society worldwide $50
3billion annually; and theft by employees around $200 billion (Greenberg and
Scott, 1996).
In standard models of criminal behavior (Becker, 1968), individuals who
undertake small illegal actions evaluate the probabilities and consequences
of being punished and commit a crime only if the expected value of doing
so exceeds the utility of the status quo. An important implication of this
simpliﬁed model is that every individual would commit a small crime if the
probability of being prosecuted is negligible. This implausible prediction
is the result of not allowing the preferences of individuals to depend on
the harm the intended crime is perceived to impose. Perhaps it is more
plausible that individuals who perceive a crime as having relatively severe
consequences for society will not commit the crime despite the fact they
could do so without being punished. The perception of the severity of small
crimes in society, rather than (or, in addition to) the (low) probabilities of
being caught, could therefore be an important determinant of small crime.
This makes it of interest to measure and analyze the perceived severity of
small crime. Measuring the perception of small crime can also be useful to
evaluate how sentencing guidelines correspond to public sentiment and to the
allocation of police resources (Miethe, 1982).
In this paper we measure perceptions of small crime and relate these to
information on crimes committed, based on a questionnaire developed by us
and administered to participants of the CentERpanel, a large representative
sample from the Dutch population of ages 16 years and older. In the ques-
tionnaire we ask the respondents to subjectively rate the severity of a number
of small crimes. We also ask them to evaluate six small crimes presented in
a setting with more (hypothetical) context. In such ‘vignette’ questions,
several characteristics of a ﬁctitious person committing the small crime and
other factors related to the situation are included in the description. The
small crimes in the vignette questions include, inter alia, breaking a coﬀee
mug in a store and not reporting this, driving too fast on a highway, and
reporting a lower income (than the actual income) to the tax authorities,
typical actions that are ‘incorrect but nevertheless occurring more or less
frequently’ (Traxler and Winter, 2009, p. 3).
The ﬁrst to study the perceptions of ‘crime seriousness’ were Sellin and
Wolfgang (1964) who developed a new method to measure seriousness, thus
providing new insights on public consensus on and relative ordering of crim-
inal acts. The present literature focusses on serious crimes and/or prop-
erty crimes (O’Connell and Whelan, 1996; Rosenmerkel, 2001; Rossi, Waite,
Bose, and Berk, 1974), and white-collar crimes (Isenring, 2008; Piquero,
Carmichael, and Piquero, 2008; Rosenmerkel, 2001). In the present paper we
look at incorrect behaviors (‘small crimes’) that are not always condemned
4by the general public. These small crimes go beyond white-collar crimes
committed by individuals within an organization. Our analysis is related to
Halman and Luijkx (2008) who examined the public’s opinion on small crimes
from a social-values point of view. Some of our small crimes are the same
as the short descriptions used by Halman and Luijkx (2008), taken from the
1999 and 2008 waves of the European Values Study (EVS). Our approach is
diﬀerent in that it includes both short descriptions and hypothetical settings
of speciﬁc small crimes. This allows us to investigate the inﬂuence of oﬀender
and oﬀense characteristics on a respondent’s perception.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we describe the set-up
and framework of the questionnaire. Descriptive statistics summarizing the
data generated by the questionnaire are presented in Section 3. In Section 4
we order the small crimes by perceived severity. The statistical analysis is
presented in Sections 5 and 6, ﬁrst for the short questions, then for the vi-
gnette questions. Section 7 discusses some policy implications and concludes.
An Appendix gives the deﬁnitions of the variables used.
2 The questionnaire
The results in this paper are based on an online survey conducted in the
Summer of 2008 through CentERdata at Tilburg University. CentERdata
manages a panel of over two thousand ‘respondents’ (the CentERpanel,
hereafter CP), forming a representative sample of the Dutch population
aged 16 and older. The sample is based on a probability sample of the
non-institutionalized Dutch population of ages 16 years and older. Selected
households without Internet access or without a personal computer are pro-
vided with the necessary equipment so that the sample also covers the non-
Internet part of the population. Every week a questionnaire is sent out
(through the Internet) to all respondents, each week on a diﬀerent topic.
The response rate is generally above 70%. Since most respondents have par-
ticipated in previous surveys, detailed background information is available,
including gender, age, income, education, role in the household, and area of
residence.
Respondents who did not respond to the survey in the ﬁrst weekend
were asked again a few weeks later. This resulted in an ultimate survey
response rate of 83.3% (1932 respondents). Of the respondents who started
the survey, only ﬁfteen did not complete the questionnaire. The average
completion time was about thirty minutes. It seems reasonable to assume
that participating and completing the questionnaire is independent of the
variables of interest, conditional on several background variables (gender, age,
5eduction) that are used to construct survey weights. CentERdata constructs
these weights by comparing the sample with a larger household survey used
by Statistics Netherlands. These weights will be used below in computing
some of the descriptive statistics.
Our survey consists of three parts. First, the respondents were asked to
rate the severity of 18 oﬀenses and the justiﬁability of 6 oﬀenses that are taken
from EVS (using the exact same wording that EVS uses). These oﬀenses
range from taking a ballpoint from the oﬃce for private use to accepting a
bribe. The wording of the questions for the ﬁrst 18 oﬀenses is:
Below we list examples of situations that might occur in daily
life. Please evaluate the severity of these actions as you perceive
them on a scale from 1 (very severe) to 10 (not severe).
The wording for the other six oﬀenses is comparable but uses ‘justiﬁability’
instead of ‘severity’. Some of the types of small crime included in the survey
were also used by Traxler and Winter (2009), but our list of small crimes is
much larger. Second, we asked our respondents in 12 questions to rate the
perceived justiﬁability of six oﬀenses, but this time described in short sto-
ries (so-called ‘vignettes’), concerning hypothetical persons in a hypothetical
setting. Each of the six oﬀenses was described in two vignettes with varying
characteristics of the hypothetical person (the ‘vignette person’) committing
the oﬀense and of the hypothetical setting. The wording of the question is:
Do you think the behavior of [name] is: never justiﬁable, ...,
always justiﬁable
where [name] is the ﬁrst name given in the vignette, either a common female
or a common male name (randomly assigned). The six oﬀenses are: (i) not
having a valid (train) ticket; (ii) breaking a coﬀee mug and not reporting it;
(iii) taking a bundle of printing paper; (iv) driving too fast on a highway; (v)
accepting a bribe; and (vi) reporting a lower income than the actual income
to the tax authorities.
Finally, we asked some questions about the respondent’s past victim-
ization incidence, exposure to crimes in daily life, and other background
information that might be relevant. These questions are not analyzed in
the current paper. The complete survey is available upon request from the
authors. In Table 1 we present the means and standard deviations for the
answers to the six questions that appear in both the European Values Study
and the CentERpanel survey. Two questions from EVS 1999 were not asked
in EVS 2008. There seems to be general agreement between the CentER-
panel and the EVS data for most questions. An exception is smoking in a
6Table 1: European Values Study (EVS) 1999 and 2008 versus CentERpanel
(CP) 2008
Oﬀense EVS 1999 CP EVS 2008
mean (std) mean (std) mean (std)
Claiming state beneﬁts 1.52 (1.28) 1.44 (1.04) 1.52 (1.33)
Accepting a bribe 1.60 (1.31) 1.65 (1.26) 1.55 (1.23)
Throwing away litter 1.74 (1.30) 1.98 (1.42)
Avoiding a fare 2.79 (2.21) 2.47 (1.81) 2.58 (2.10)
Cheating on taxes 2.74 (2.22) 2.92 (2.14) 2.28 (1.96)
Smoking in a public place 3.81 (2.65) 2.98 (2.16)
Note: Answers are on a scale from 1 (never justiﬁable) to 10 (always justiﬁable).
All statistics are weighted. The number of observations N varies over studies and
also (slightly) over oﬀenses. We have 1001–1003 observations for the EVS 1999,
1929 for the CP, and 1542–1549 for the EVS 2008.
public place, which is seen as more severe in the CentERpanel than in EVS
1999. This is explained by the nine-year gap between the two data sets. The
perception of smoking in The Netherlands has changed in those nine years,
because smoking was banned from governmental organizations in 1990, and
from the private sector (including restaurants and bars) in July 2008, just
after the ﬁrst weekend that our survey was ﬁelded. A widely publicized
event like the introduction of a smoking ban may well lead to a (possibly
temporary) change of the social norm (Ramchand, MacDonald, Haviland,
and Morral, 2009). Comparing the two EVS waves, it appears that people
consider most oﬀenses less justiﬁable in 2008 than in 1999. This particularly
applies to cheating on taxes. Surprisingly, the CentERpanel mean for the
perceived severity of cheating on taxes is much closer to EVS 1999 than to
the 2008, event hough EVS and CP are conducted in the same year.
3 Descriptive statistics
In understanding the perception of incorrect behavior or small crimes, three
dimensions are relevant. First, respondent characteristics, which tell us
whether the respondent being interviewed is male of female, old or young,
rich or poor, educated or not educated, and so on; second, characteristics
of who commits the small crime, for example male or female, young or old,
rich or poor; and third, characteristics related to the context of the oﬀense
itself, for example whether a superior behaves in the same incorrect way. In
Table 2 we present some descriptive statistics of the respondent character-




hh lincome 7.93 (1.43)
crime rate 7.31 (1.22)
Binary
female 0.47 (0.50)
edu prim 0.07 (0.25)
edu secon1 0.26 (0.44)
edu secon2 0.12 (0.33)
edu vocat1 0.19 (0.39)
edu vocat2 0.24 (0.43)
edu univer 0.12 (0.32)
urban low 0.39 (0.49)
urban high 0.41 (0.49)
urban middle 0.20 (0.40)
occup empl 0.48 (0.50)
occup pension 0.23 (0.42)
occup indep 0.05 (0.21)
occup nowork 0.24 (0.43)
position head 0.62 (0.49)
partner 0.79 (0.41)
party christ 0.22 (0.42)
party other 0.19 (0.39)
Note: See Appendix, Tables 8 and 9 for variable deﬁnitions.
Statistics are not weighted. N varies between 1918 and 1931.
istics. Details on variable deﬁnitions are presented in Tables 8 and 9 in the
Appendix.
Roughly 47% of the sample is female. The age of the respondents ranges
from 15 to 93 with a mean of 51. Highly-educated respondents are overrepre-
sented: 36% completed higher vocational school or has a university degree in
our sample as compared to 25% in the population in 2006 (Statistics Nether-
lands, 2008). This is because the higher educated have a larger probability
to participate in the CentERpanel. We will use sample weights (provided by
CentERdata) to correct for this.
To capture the eﬀect of how familiar respondents are with crime, we
8include the crime rate (the number of registered crimes per capita) at the
provincial level, which varies from 4.55% to 9.01%. Within a given province,
crimes are more common in cities than in rural areas. Hence, we also include
the degree of urbanization. Our respondents are well spread in terms of
urbanization, with 41% living in cities, 20% in larger towns, and 39% living
in villages or small towns.
We distinguish between four types of occupation. The largest group (48%)
are those in paid employment (occup empl). It is likely that one’s occupa-
tional status inﬂuences one’s perception of crime. For example, employees
may be more sympathetic than others to someone taking a bundle of print-
ing paper from the oﬃce for private use, because they are more familiar with
this kind of situation. The majority of the respondents (62%) is head of a
household (deﬁned as the person who owns the house or signed the rental
contract, or, if this applies to more than one person, the one with the high-
est income). In about 67% of all cases, household heads live together with a
partner (married or unmarried). Being head of a household or the partner of
the household head may imply that one’s behavior is an example to the rest
of the household, which may lead to a diﬀerent attitude to (small) crimes.
Finally, about four out of ﬁve respondents reported that they support a na-
tional political party; the others support a local party or do not feel aﬃliated
with any political party. Of those supporting a national party, about one-
quarter supports a Christian party. We included a dummy for supporting a
Christian party as a proxy for ethical norms and values that may possibly
aﬀect attitudes towards (small) crime.
A large part of this paper (especially Section 6) will focus on the addi-
tional information provided in the vignette questions, including some char-
acteristics of the person who commits the crime and the context in which
the crime is committed. In Table 3 we present some descriptive statistics,
comparing the vignette evaluations and the answers to the corresponding
short questions. Figures 1 and 2 provide the complete distributions of the
answers.
We have almost twice as many observations (3840) for the vignette ques-
tions as for the short questions (1930), because our respondents evaluated
two vignette questions for each type of oﬀense (with diﬀerent context and
characteristics of the vignette person). For each oﬀense, the income of the
person committing the oﬀense is always lower in the ﬁrst vignette than in the
second vignette (while other characteristics are randomized; see Section 6).
Figure 2 shows separate histograms for the answers to these two questions,
clearly illustrating that respondents tend to perceive an oﬀense as more se-
vere if the income of the person committing the oﬀense is higher.
Accepting a bribe in the course of duty is considered least justiﬁed, both
9Table 3: Descriptive statistics: dependent variables
median mean (std)
Short questions
Avoiding a fare 2 2.47 (1.81)
Breaking a coﬀee mug 4 4.13 (2.10)
Taking a bundle of printing paper 4 4.09 (2.28)
Driving too fast on a highway 3 3.09 (2.13)
Accepting a bribe 1 1.65 (1.26)
Cheating on taxes 2 2.92 (2.14)
Vignette questions
Avoiding a fare 4 3.88 (2.33)
Breaking a coﬀee mug 3 3.47 (2.08)
Taking a bundle of printing paper 3 3.19 (2.05)
Driving too fast on a highway 2 2.73 (1.96)
Accepting a bribe 1 2.10 (1.59)
Cheating on taxes 2 2.81 (1.96)
Note: Answers are on a scale from 1 (very severe/never justiﬁable) to 10
(not severe at all/always justiﬁable). All statistics are weighted.
N varies between 1929 and 1932 for short questions and between 3840
and 3846 for vignette questions.
in the short questions and in the vignette questions. Accepting a bribe and
avoiding a fare are considered more serious oﬀenses when posed as a short
question than as a vignette question, and the opposite holds for breaking
a coﬀee mug or driving too fast on a highway. This also aﬀects the order
of perceived seriousness of the crimes: avoiding a fare is considered the sec-
ond most serious oﬀense in the short questions, but the least serious oﬀense
according to the vignette questions. We therefore conclude that there are
substantial diﬀerences between the answers to the short questions and the
vignette questions. Since the vignette questions provide more information
about the context in which the oﬀense is committed, this shows that context
matters.
Riedel (1975) asked respondents to rate the importance of oﬀense and
oﬀender characteristics for judging the seriousness of a described oﬀense. He
concludes that respondents need external factors to make a judgement. On
the other hand, Rossi et al. (1997) ﬁnd that the oﬀender’s background only
has a small impact on sentencing preferences. How context matters will be
studied in detail in Section 6.
10Figure 1: Answers to selected short questions
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11Figure 2: Answers to vignette questions
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12The sample standard deviations in the answers to the short questions and
the vignette questions are of similar size; two of the six standard deviations
are larger for the vignette questions; the other four are larger for the short
questions. Herzog (2003) argues that when judgements are based on less
information regarding the circumstances of the crime (e.g. oﬀender charac-
teristics) respondents will make quick judgements based on shared norms in
a society, which would suggest that the dispersion in the answers to the short
questions would be smaller than for the vignette questions. We do not ﬁnd
any such evidence in Table 3.
4 Ordering of small crimes
In the ﬁrst part of the survey, our respondents were confronted with 24 types
of incorrect behavior from three categories: (i) at the cost of the employer, (ii)
at the cost of the government, and (iii) at the cost of others. Table 4 describes
these 24 small crimes, ordered according to the mean evaluations, from most
severe to least severe. Applying for social beneﬁts to which one is not entitled
is considered the most severe of all oﬀenses considered, followed by accepting
a bribe in the course of duty. Both are oﬀenses that may endanger the
welfare state and the social security system. Remarkably, throwing away
litter in public places (ranked 3 out of 24) and not cleaning up the dog’s pooh
(ranked 7), oﬀenses that pollute the environment, also rank quite high. That
social security fraud is perceived as more severe than tax fraud is in line with
Wilson et al. (1986), who found the same for Australian data, even though in
their survey the monetary damage of the tax fraud was much higher than that
of the social security fraud (5000 and 2000 Australian dollars, respectively;
the amounts were stated explicitly in the survey).
Traﬃc violations, even rather extreme ones, like driving 170 km/h on
a highway where the speed limit is 120 km/h, are not considered as very
severe, perhaps suggesting that many people see the maximum speed rules
as unnecessarily strict. As expected, taking away soap and shampoo from a
hotel room is considered the least severe of small crimes. Most respondents
do not consider this as a small crime at all, but see the soap and shampoo
as a ‘gift’ from the hotel. Taking a ballpoint home from the oﬃce is also
one of the least severe small crimes. It is an example of ‘internal fraud’ and,
according to Greenberg (2002), this occurs more frequently when employees
feel underpaid or when employees consider the decision-making criteria as
unfair. Downloading music illegally also appears in the bottom three of the
ranking; downloading music is not illegal in The Netherlands as long as it
is for private use and from a legal source, but the majority of music oﬀered
13Table 4: Ordering of 24 small crimes in terms of perceived severity
Oﬀense mean (std)
Claiming government beneﬁts to which one is not entitled* 1.44 (1.04)
Accepting a bribe at work* 1.65 (1.26)
Throwing away litter in a public place* 1.98 (1.43)
Damaging a car by accident and not informing the owner 2.10 (1.36)
Turning up the volume of music late in the evening 2.15 (1.40)
Avoiding a fare on public transport* 2.47 (1.81)
Walking the dog and not cleaning up the dog’s pooh 2.71 (1.73)
Pretending to be sick and staying at home for two days 2.84 (1.90)
Cheating on taxes if one has a chance* 2.92 (2.14)
Smoking in a public building* 2.98 (2.16)
Driving 170 km/h on a highway (maximum is 120 km/h) 3.09 (2.13)
Leaving a barking dog alone at home 3.19 (1.78)
Taking cutlery from a canteen 3.21 (1.91)
Taking a bundle of printing paper and 5 ballpoints from the oﬃce 3.30 (2.01)
Practicing the piano in an apartment building from 7:00–10:00 am 3.47 (1.96)
Taking software from the oﬃce to install it at home illegally 3.94 (2.31)
Taking a bundle of printing paper from the oﬃce 4.09 (2.28)
Breaking a coﬀee mug in a store and not informing the owner 4.13 (2.10)
Making daily private phone calls from the oﬃce 4.49 (2.33)
Working two evenings per week without paying income tax 4.51 (2.34)
Driving 60 km/h within town (maximum is 50 km/h) 5.19 (2.56)
Downloading music illegally from time to time 5.98 (2.53)
Taking a ballpoint from the oﬃce 6.27 (2.70)
Taking soap and shampoo from a posh hotel room 7.03 (2.66)
Note: Answers are on a scale from 1 (very severe/never justiﬁable) to 10
(not severe/always justiﬁable). All statistics are weighted. The formulation of some oﬀenses
(indicated by *) is shortened to ﬁt the table. The full survey is available upon request.
at peer-to-peer networks comes from illegal sources. Apparently, there is no
strong social condemnation of digital piracy as this has no perceived social
cost. This is in line with the theoretical arguments of Balestrino (2008).
5 Results: Short questions
Six of the 24 short questions presented in the previous section are analyzed
in the current paper — the six that are similar to the crimes in the vignette
questions. This is because we focus on the modiﬁcation of responses resulting
14from information about the oﬀender and oﬀense characteristics, as given in
the vignette questions. Since the response scale is discrete and ordered,
ranging from 1 (very severe) to 10 (not severe at all), we use an ordered
probit model. (An ordered logit model leads to very similar results.) This
model describes the reported evaluation as the category containing the value
of an unobserved (latent) continuous variable y∗
i, which is driven by a vector











ǫi ∼ N(0,1) independent of xi,
and i = 1,...,N denote the respondents, and j = 1,...,m are the possi-
ble values that yi can have. We set m = 10 and let α0 = −∞ and αm =
∞. The estimation results are presented in Table 5. Some of the earlier
studies focus on measuring the degree of consensus between diﬀerent demo-
graphic groups (see for example Kwan et al., 2002; O’Connell and Whelan,
1996; Rossi et al., 1974; Sellin and Wolfgang, 1964), since public consensus is
required to develop a generally supported seriousness scale of criminal activ-
ities. Diﬀerences between groups were studied by Rosenmerkel (2001), who
also looks at a larger set of respondent characteristics, including detailed
indexes of socio-economic status. We interpret these results as follows.
Gender: The negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect of the dummy for females
indicates that women perceive all six small crimes as more serious than men,
ceteris paribus (that is, with the same age, education, household income,
urbanization rate, and provincial crime rate). This is in line with the re-
sults reported by Herzog and Oreg (2008), O’Connell and Whelan (1996),
and Rossi et al. (1985), and may be due to the fact that women are more
vulnerable and have a stronger fear of being victimized (Warr, 1984). On
the other hand, Kwan et al. (2002) ﬁnd a gender eﬀect only for crimes that
disproportionately aﬀect women, and Isenring (2008) ﬁnds no gender eﬀect
on the perceived seriousness of white-collar crimes. Kwan et al. (2002) ﬁnd
that bribery (similar to our situation 5) is rated as more serious by men than
by women. Orviska and Hudson (2002) ﬁnd that women are more likely to
approve tax evasion (speciﬁcally, value-added tax), which is in contrast to
our result for situation 6 (reporting a lower income to the tax authorities).
Age: Older people rate all six small crimes as more serious than younger
people, and the age eﬀect is always signiﬁcant. This result is in line with
15Table 5: Ordered probit on short questions
Situation
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
female −0.1887*** −0.2170*** −0.1430*** −0.3282*** −0.1572*** −0.2653***
(0.0509) (0.0477) (0.0481) (0.0496) (0.0575) (0.0498)
age −0.0153*** −0.0111*** −0.0216*** −0.0192*** −0.0123*** −0.0012
(0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0015)
hh lincome −0.0101 −0.0059 −0.0273* −0.0034 0.0111 −0.0191
(0.0186) (0.0185) (0.0162) (0.0167) (0.0212) (0.0184)
crime rate 0.0155 0.0254 0.0234 0.0242 0.0026 0.0557***
(0.0217) (0.0205) (0.0200) (0.0204) (0.0244) (0.0216)
edu secon1 −0.0330 −0.0662 −0.0549 0.1592 −0.1906* −0.1030
(0.1085) (0.1048) (0.1063) (0.1019) (0.1120) (0.1012)
edu secon2 −0.0693 −0.0520 −0.1256 0.1782 −0.3303*** −0.1198
(0.1198) (0.1121) (0.1179) (0.1117) (0.1243) (0.1137)
edu vocat1 −0.0718 −0.1210 −0.0518 0.3209*** −0.1598 −0.2684***
(0.1090) (0.1070) (0.1075) (0.1025) (0.1128) (0.1041)
edu vocat2 −0.2870*** −0.1863* −0.1638 0.1592 −0.6597*** −0.4281***
(0.1074) (0.1032) (0.1054) (0.0993) (0.1133) (0.1032)
edu univer −0.1151 −0.1348 −0.0707 0.2409** −0.5960*** −0.2650**
(0.1186) (0.1115) (0.1130) (0.1130) (0.1305) (0.1112)
urban high 0.0307 0.1348** 0.1006* −0.2780*** −0.1212* −0.1982***
(0.0589) (0.0546) (0.0557) (0.0582) (0.0673) (0.0583)
urban middle 0.0133 0.0865 0.0788 −0.1731*** −0.0500 0.0248
(0.0703) (0.0668) (0.0658) (0.0655) (0.0758) (0.0684)
N 1914 1917 1917 1917 1914 1914
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗ = {p < 0.01}; ∗∗ = {0.01 ≤ p < 0.05}; ∗ = {0.05 ≤ p < 0.10}.
Situations: 1 = not having a valid (train) ticket; 2 = breaking a coﬀee mug;
3 = taking a bundle of printing paper; 4 = driving too fast on a highway;
5 = accepting a bribe; 6 = reporting a lower income to the tax authorities.
Orviska and Hudson (2002) and O’Connell and Whelan (1996), and is prob-
ably due to the fact that older people feel more vulnerable than younger
people (Warr, 1984).
Income: Although household income has a negative eﬀect in ﬁve of the
six questions, the eﬀect is never signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Apparently, the
respondent’s income does not matter much for his or her perception of small
crime. This is in line with Rosenmerkel (2001), who also ﬁnds no income
eﬀect for several types of crimes, including white-collar crime (although he
16did ﬁnd that respondents with higher income considered violent crimes as
less serious), but is in contrast with Rossi et al. (1985), who report that
higher income is associated with more tolerance towards white-collar crimes.
Education: Educational dummies are jointly signiﬁcant in four out of
six situations, but the patterns are non-monotonic and vary across ques-
tions. Respondents with higher vocational training seem to perceive most
small crimes as more serious than respondents with other education levels,
including those with a university education. Rossi et al. (1985) also ﬁnd an
inconsistent pattern of the eﬀect of education on the perception of diﬀerent
types of crime. Orviska and Hudson (2002) ﬁnd that a higher education level
increases disapproval of tax evasion, a result that is similar to our result for
situation 6. Only in situation 4 (driving too fast), higher education leads
to less harsh judgements. That a higher education would lead to less harsh
judgements is also found by Isenring (2008) (for white-collar crimes), Payne
et al. (2004) (for ﬁve diﬀerent crimes), and O’Connell and Whelan (1996)
(for selling marihuana). Rossi et al. (1974) also report that respondents with
lower education are less tolerant towards small crime than higher-educated
respondents, and Schrager and Short (1980) conﬁrm this ﬁnding for white-
collar crimes.
Crime rate: Respondents who live in areas with a higher crime rate are
expected to be more familiar with serious crime. As a consequence, they may
rate small crimes as less severe, and this is what we ﬁnd for all six situations,
although the eﬀect is signiﬁcant for situation 6 (tax evasion) only.
Urbanization: Crime rates are higher in large cities than in smaller towns
or rural areas (Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1999). Since we include the crime
rate by province but not by municipality, this implies that the degree of
urbanization can be seen as a proxy for within-province variation in the
exposure to crime. Living in an urbanized area may also have an eﬀect on
the perception of crime through social norms. The eﬀects of urbanization
that we ﬁnd are ambiguous: in two situations (which are among the more
serious of the small crimes considered), respondents living in an urbanized
area consider crimes signiﬁcantly less severe than respondents in the least
urbanized areas, but in situation 2 (breaking a coﬀee mug and not reporting
it) the opposite eﬀect is found. Rose and Prell (1955) discuss the eﬀect of
urbanization on ‘punitiveness’ and ﬁnd that respondents who do not live in
an urban area think that punishments should be harsher than respondents
in urban areas. Stylianou (2003) cites several studies that ﬁnd an eﬀect of
the degree of urbanization on other social norms, such as abortion. Perhaps
the weak non-monotonic relation that we ﬁnd is due to increasing mobility
and homogeneity, reducing the gap between rural and urban areas (Smith
and Huﬀ, 1982). In addition, there is evidence that perceptions within rural
17areas are not homogeneous (Ball, 2001).
6 Results: Vignette questions
The vignette section of the survey presents several stories (‘vignettes’) about
small crimes committed by oﬀenders with varying characteristics, and asks
the respondents to evaluate how justiﬁable the oﬀense is on a 10-point scale,
from absolutely not justiﬁable (1) to certainly justiﬁable (10). Each respon-
dent is presented with twelve vignettes in total, two on each of the six types
of small crime presented in Table 3. The two vignettes on each type of crime
diﬀer in the characteristics of the person who commits the crime and the
context in which the crime is committed. A typical example is:
[John/Diana] is [27/43/55] years old and earns A C2500 per month
before tax, a [low/usual] wage for the type of work (s)he does.
Each day (s)he takes the tram to work, for a trip of about [5/20]
minutes. Today (s)he is in a hurry since (s)he does not want to
arrive late at work. (S)he jumps on the tram without a valid
ticket. It has [not/often] happened before that (s)he knowingly
did not have a valid ticket. The probability that someone will
check the tickets on this route is [very small/50%]. Do you think
[John/Diana]’s behavior is absolutely not justiﬁable (1),..., cer-
tainly justiﬁable (10)?
The parts in square brackets are randomized (independently of each other).
For each situation and each respondent, the oﬀender’s income is lower in the
ﬁrst than in the second vignette. (In the example above, A C2500 in the ﬁrst
vignette and A C3500 in the second vignette.) The name of the oﬀender is
randomized: about half of the crimes in these vignettes are committed by
men (that is, use a male name); the other half by women. The oﬀender’s age
is randomly set to 27, 43, or 55 years. In this example, the absolute income
level of the oﬀender is always A C2500, but it can be relatively low or usual
for the type of work the oﬀender does. The other randomizations do not
concern the oﬀender but the context in which the crime is committed: how
long does the trip take (5 or 15 minutes), is the oﬀense committed repeatedly
or only once, what are the chances of getting caught (low or 50%)? Similar
randomizations are used for the other vignettes.
The fact that each respondent answers two vignette questions on each
oﬀense (with diﬀerent values of the randomized vignette variables) allows us





itβ + ǫit, i = 1,...,N, t = 1,2,
yit = j if αj−1 < y
∗
it ≤ αj, j = 1,...,m,
where
ǫit = ui + υit,
ui ∼ N(0,σ
2
u), independent of xi1,xi,2,υi1,υi2,
υit ∼iid N(0,σ
2
υ), independent of xi1,xi2.
Again, we set m = 10 and let α0 = −∞ and αm = ∞. Without loss of
generality we normalize σ2
ǫ (= σ2
u+σ2
υ) to 1. For the explanatory variables in
xit, we distinguish between respondent characteristics (income, age, gender,
education, occupational status; see Section 5), characteristics of the vignette
person committing the crime, and variables describing the context in which
the crime is committed. This allows us to disentangle the eﬀects of re-
spondent characteristics and characteristics of the oﬀender on the perceived
severity of each oﬀense. We label vignette characteristics random as they
are the result of a randomization process. Note that vignette characteristics
vary with i and t, while respondent characteristics vary with i only.
In the baseline model presented in Tables 6a and 6b, xit includes all
vignette characteristics and demographics that were also used in Section 5:
gender, age, household income, education, the crime rate in the province of
residence, and the urbanization rate. Because of the design, there is some
variation in vignette characteristics across the six situations. An example is
vign boss, which captures the eﬀect on perceived justiﬁability if the boss of
the vignette person behaves correctly under the same circumstances. This
variable is only included in two of the six situations. We also considered
extensions of the baseline model including more respondent characteristics
(respondent’s occupation, position within a household, and preference for
a Christian political party). Selected results for the extended models are
presented in Table 7. We discuss and interpret these results below.
6.1 Respondent characteristics
The eﬀects of respondent characteristics were already discussed in the previ-
ous sections. The main question now is whether these eﬀects are diﬀerent if
we explicitly control for vignette characteristics.
Gender: Not much changes. We ﬁnd similar eﬀects as for the short
questions. Women consider the oﬀenses less justiﬁable than men, especially
regarding driving too fast on a highway.
19Table 6: Random eﬀects ordered probit
(a) Respondent characteristics
Situation
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
female −0.1775 −0.4754*** −0.3359*** −1.4000*** −1.2307*** −0.9644***
(0.1105) (0.1142) (0.1135) (0.1350) (0.1142) (0.1259)
age −0.0087*** −0.0082** −0.0430*** −0.0509*** −0.0416*** −0.0237***
(0.0032) (0.0039) (0.0036) (0.0042) (0.0034) (0.0037)
hh lincome −0.0067 −0.0476 −0.0272 −0.1745*** −0.0924*** −0.1762***
(0.0378) (0.0477) (0.0298) (0.0364) (0.0340) (0.0269)
crime rate 0.0880** 0.2405*** 0.1691*** 0.3897*** 0.2232*** 0.3639***
(0.0446) (0.0432) (0.0642) (0.0570) (0.0450) (0.0487)
edu secon1 −0.1647 −0.8979*** −0.1432 −0.0977 −0.6907*** −0.2853
(0.3054) (0.2229) (0.2766) (0.2764) (0.1839) (0.2572)
edu secon2 0.0167 −0.4125* −0.3468 0.4387 −1.3166*** −0.3959
(0.3286) (0.2436) (0.3007) (0.2875) (0.2252) (0.2761)
edu vocat1 −0.1069 −0.8834*** −0.0484 0.2829 −1.3366*** −0.8246***
(0.3065) (0.2167) (0.3069) (0.2517) (0.1862) (0.2629)
edu vocat2 −0.2527 −0.8612*** −0.4725* −0.6029** −2.2939*** −1.3780***
(0.3208) (0.2196) (0.2762) (0.2403) (0.2173) (0.2868)
edu univer 0.3684 −1.4330*** −0.2069 −0.1554 −2.6853*** −1.9023***
(0.3327) (0.2530) (0.2965) (0.2738) (0.2152) (0.2703)
urban high −0.1307 0.0079 0.1733 −1.8075*** −0.0109 −0.8207***
(0.1227) (0.1219) (0.1274) (0.1769) (0.1156) (0.1429)
urban middle 0.2656* −0.0118 0.0984 −1.1946*** 0.0501 0.1816
(0.1424) (0.1356) (0.2282) (0.1780) (0.1604) (0.1557)
N 3816 3812 3810 3810 3810 3810
ρ 0.8382 0.8813 0.8564 0.9258 0.9166 0.9176
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗ = {p < 0.01}; ∗∗ = {0.01 ≤ p < 0.05}; ∗ = {0.05 ≤ p < 0.10}.
Situations: 1 = not having a valid (train) ticket; 2 = breaking a coﬀee mug;
3 = taking a bundle of printing paper; 4 = driving too fast on a highway;
5 = accepting a bribe; 6 = reporting a lower income to the tax authorities.
Age: The signs and signiﬁcance levels of the eﬀects of the respondent’s
age are almost the same as for the short questions. Older respondents always
give signiﬁcantly more severe ratings in all situations. For tax evasion, the
negative age eﬀect is now signiﬁcant and larger in magnitude than for some
of the other small crimes, while it was insigniﬁcant in the short questions.
20Table 6: Random eﬀects ordered probit (cont.)
(b) Vignette characteristics
Situation
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
vign wage −0.3496*** −0.5564*** −0.3154*** −0.2604*** −0.3403*** −0.3813***
(0.0594) (0.0637) (0.0632) (0.0700) (0.0798) (0.0688)
vign female 0.0014 −0.0937* 0.0095 0.1205** −0.0878 −0.1146**
(0.0499) (0.0527) (0.0520) (0.0590) (0.0610) (0.0568)
vign 43y 0.0683 0.1153* 0.0875 0.1039 −0.0330 0.0030
(0.0594) (0.0631) (0.0625) (0.0717) (0.0759) (0.0733)
vign 55y 0.0937 0.1683*** 0.0584 0.0176 −0.0189 0.0246
(0.0599) (0.0625) (0.0622) (0.0761) (0.0743) (0.0699)
vign freq −1.2838*** −0.4162*** −0.5922*** −0.3840*** −0.2644***
(0.0531) (0.0518) (0.0624) (0.0616) (0.0570)








vign wage us −0.0941 −0.0117 −0.1123 −0.1171 −0.1473* −0.1626**
(0.0684) (0.0726) (0.0730) (0.0879) (0.0873) (0.0787)
vign wage hi −0.0520 −0.1416* −0.0974 −0.0830 0.0658 −0.1025
(0.0685) (0.0728) (0.0730) (0.0878) (0.0885) (0.0798)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗ = {p < 0.01}; ∗∗ = {0.01 ≤ p < 0.05}; ∗ = {0.05 ≤ p < 0.10}.
Situations: 1 = not having a valid (train) ticket; 2 = breaking a coﬀee mug;
3 = taking a bundle of printing paper; 4 = driving too fast on a highway;
5 = accepting a bribe; 6 = reporting a lower income to the tax authorities.
Income: In the short questions, we hardly found any income eﬀects. But
in the vignette questions, household income has a negative and signiﬁcant
eﬀect in three of the six situations: respondents with a higher household
income consider driving too fast, accepting a bribe, and tax evasion as less
justiﬁable than low income respondents.
Education: Educational dummies are jointly signiﬁcant in ﬁve of the six
situations and the eﬀects of education are quite diﬀerent from those in Table 5
— non-monotonicity is no longer an issue. The ﬁnding in the previous section
21Table 7: Random eﬀects ordered probit: extended speciﬁcation
Situation
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
occup pension 0.0522 0.0410 0.1931 0.0990 0.4226** −0.2838
(0.1641) (0.1724) (0.1947) (0.1654) (0.1989) (0.1791)
occup indep 0.7616*** 0.8261 0.7554*** 1.2896*** 1.6483*** 0.9740***
(0.2042) (0.5943) (0.2578) (0.2014) (0.2008) (0.2355)
occup nowork −0.2611** −0.0872 0.0908 −0.6818*** 0.1566 0.6460***
(0.1328) (0.1608) (0.1726) (0.1613) (0.1731) (0.1610)








N 3816 3812 3810 3810 3810 3806
ρ 0.8406 0.8825 0.8559 0.9319 0.9139 0.9214
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗ = {p < 0.01}; ∗∗ = {0.01 ≤ p < 0.05}; ∗ = {0.05 ≤ p < 0.10}.
Situations: 1 = not having a valid (train) ticket; 2 = breaking a coﬀee mug;
3 = taking a bundle of printing paper; 4 = driving too fast on a highway;
5 = accepting a bribe; 6 = reporting a lower income to the tax authorities.
that higher-educated respondents rate tax evasion as more severe than the
lower educated is much stronger now.
Crime rate: As for the short questions, higher provincial crime rates make
respondents judge less harshly, while in the vignette regressions this holds
for all situations. The eﬀect is particularly strong for situation 6 (reporting
a lower income to the tax authorities).
Urbanization: The eﬀects of urbanization are still as ambiguous as in the
previous section.
The extended speciﬁcations in Table 7 include, inter alia, the same re-
spondent and vignette characteristics as before. Since the coeﬃcients on
these variables hardly change when additional regressors are added, we do
not present or discuss them, and focus on the eﬀects of the additional vari-
ables, referring to occupational status and aﬃliation with a Christian political
party.
22Occupational status: Self-employed respondents are signiﬁcantly less harsh
on ﬁve types of small crime than employees, while pensioners are less harsh
in only one situation. The latter result is not in line with Herzog and Oreg
(2008), who ﬁnd that part-time employees consider crimes relatively less jus-
tiﬁable than full-timers. W¨ arneryd and Walerud (1982) ﬁnd no eﬀect of
self-employment or occupation on the attitude towards tax evasion.
Political party: The ﬁnal additional variable is aﬃliation with a Christian
political party. The literature is ambiguous on this issue. Herzog and Oreg
(2008) found that individuals who lead a conservative life also have more
conservative views towards crime. Similarly, Payne et al. (2004) reported
that conservativeness is positively related to the tendency to punish harder.
On the other hand, Isenring (2008) did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of political
preferences on crime seriousness ratings. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect in
ﬁve of the six situations. But we do ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect in situation 6:
respondents who feel attached to a Christian party rate tax fraud as a more
serious oﬀense than other respondents.
6.2 Vignette characteristics
In 1996 the Catholic Dutch Bishop Tiny Muskens declared that the poor
have a right to steal bread when they are hungry and see no other way
to survive. This statement caused some turmoil, especially in the bakery
industry, but was also applauded, and some years later Bishop Muskens was
appointed Honorary Citizen of Breda. We ﬁnd that the most salient eﬀect
of the vignette characteristics is the eﬀect of the vignette person’s earnings
level (vign wage). For all situations, respondents consider the oﬀense less
justiﬁable if the person who commits it earns more. The explanation is
probably that the respondents feel that people with higher income can better
aﬀord to be honest. The coeﬃcients for this variable are of approximately
the same size, except for situation 2 (breaking a coﬀee mug in a shop), for
which the eﬀect is by far the largest, and situation 4 (speeding) for which
the eﬀect is lowest.
In addition to the absolute earnings level, each vignette situation also
provides information on how earnings compare to those of others with a
similar job. This information depends on the earnings level: if the earnings
level is high, then the vignette states either ‘this income is usual for this
type of work’ or ‘this income is high for this type of work’ (vign wage hi =
1). If absolute earnings are low, the vignette states either ‘this income is
low for this type of work’ or ‘this income is usual for this type of work’
(vign wage us = 1). A negative sign on both vign wage us and vign wage hi
implies that respondents are harsher if earnings of the oﬀender are relatively
23high, given the type of work. The eﬀects are mostly insigniﬁcant, however,
and much weaker than the eﬀects of absolute earnings. It seems that relative
income matters more if the oﬀender’s absolute income is low than if it is
high: the coeﬃcient of vign wage us is signiﬁcant in two situations; that of
vign wage hi in only one situation. Perhaps surprisingly, the relative wage
level plays no signiﬁcant role for the only work-related situation (taking a
bundle of printing paper home).
As expected, if a vignette person has committed the same crime before
(vign freq = 1), it is considered more severe than if the crime is committed
for the ﬁrst time. The eﬀect is signiﬁcant in all ﬁve situations where this
information is provided. People are generally more forgiving if the oﬀense
only happens once; see also Herzog and Oreg (2008) and Rossi et al. (1985).
Important is also the probability that the oﬀender gets caught. A larger
probability to get caught (vign catch = 1) leads to a harsher judgement, and
the eﬀect is signiﬁcant in two out of three cases. An explanation could be
that a large probability to get caught suggests that the oﬀense is taken more
seriously by society, so that the respondent interprets it as a proxy for the
social norm.
The behavior of the oﬀender’s superior matters. The superior sets an
example to the employees and inﬂuences the norms within the organization.
If the superior behaves correctly (vign boss = 1) (e.g. does not take printing
paper home for private use), then the respondents think it is less justiﬁable
for the employees to behave incorrectly and consider the oﬀense signiﬁcantly
more severe. This type of behavior is referred to as ‘parallel deviance’, where
unethical behavior on the part of a superior sends a message to an employee
that deviant behavior is legitimate or even the standard within an organi-
zation (Greenberg and Scott, 1996; Jones and Kavanagh, 1996). Jones and
Kavanagh (1996) empirically examine individual and situational factors that
drive unethical behavior at the workplace, but ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect for
parallel deviance. This may be the result of the use of behavioral intentions
as the dependent variable instead of actual behavior.
The eﬀects of other vignette characteristics are speciﬁc to the situation.
Older oﬀenders are judged signiﬁcantly less harshly than others when break-
ing a coﬀee mug in a shop and not reporting it (situation 2). Diﬀerences
between ratings of small crimes committed by male and female oﬀenders are
insigniﬁcant in four situations, and marginally signiﬁcant with opposite signs
in the other two situations. These results are not in line with those of Rossi
et al. (1985) who ﬁnd, in the case of property crimes, that older oﬀenders
are judged more severely than young oﬀenders, and females are judged more
mildly than males.
247 Concluding remarks
Perceptions are said to reﬂect an underlying normative structure. In this
paper we have tried to disentangle the factors that drive these perceptions
using subject, oﬀender, and oﬀense characteristics. One of the strengths
of the paper is the quality and quantity of the data. We had access to an
excellent panel with a high response rate and we were able to ask almost 2000
respondents many questions on incorrect behavior of which some activities
are forbidden by law while other activities are not forbidden but can be
perceived as morally wrong. Important novelties of our approach are that we
use vignette questions to incorporate characteristics of the oﬀender, and that
we consider small crimes. Most of the literature in this ﬁeld considers very
serious crimes such as murder and armed robbery. The public’s perception
of less serious crimes or incorrect behavior is less known. This paper tries to
ﬁll this gap.
Respondents evaluate a given (small) crime diﬀerently if they know more
about the oﬀender and the circumstances. From a methodological point of
view, this means that the analysis through vignettes is useful. If we compare
the short and vignette questions (Tables 5 and 6a), we see, for example,
that respondents from an area with a relatively high crime rate will judge
more mildly than respondents from a more peaceful area. This is not evident
from our short questions, but it is evident from the vignette questions. The
vignette questions also provide a consistent result for education: higher-
educated subjects judge more harshly.
The respondents judge a small crime committed by an underprivileged
person less harshly than the same crime committed by a wealthy person. Not
everyone would agree with Bishop Muskens that a poor man is allowed to
steal bread, but income does play a role in people’s judgment. This is true
even for non-ﬁnancial crimes such as speeding; see Table 6b, situation 4. If
this is indeed the public’s sentiment, then one may wonder why punishments
are not income-dependent. It is not unusual to make company ﬁnes depen-
dent on the revenue earned in a certain period, for example when breaking
competition laws. Income-dependent ﬁnes for individuals are not common in
The Netherlands, although they do exist in some other European countries,
such as Germany and Switzerland.
No doubt, one can learn much from the experiences in other countries.
The current study considers only The Netherlands. Evans and Scott (1984)
compared the perception in two diﬀerent cultures: United States and Kuwait.
While violent, property, and white-collar oﬀenses were perceived similarly,
moral oﬀenses (selling illegal drugs, prostitution, having an illegal abortion,
committing perjury) were perceived very diﬀerently. A new international
25study involving more countries would be of great interest.
Various other extensions could also be of interest. It is likely that past
victims of a (small) crime judge more harshly than subjects who have never
been a victim; see the discussion on the eﬀect of victimization on a sub-
ject’s judgment in Pease (1988). Hence, including a measure of victimization
may provide additional insight. In addition, a multivariate approach would
identify factors driving a subject’s judgment in general, hence not only in a
speciﬁc situation.
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Appendix
In Tables 8 and 9 we provide two lists: one of respondent variables and one
of binary vignette variables, both with explanation.
29Table 8: List of respondent variables with explanation
Non-binary variables
age age of respondent (in years)
hh lincome log of gross monthly household income
crime rate % number of crimes over total population in a province
Binary variables
female 1 if respondent is a woman
edu prim 1 if respondent’s highest education is primary school
edu secon1 1 if — lower general secondary school
edu secon2 1 if — higher general secondary school
edu vocat1 1 if — intermediate vocational school
edu vocat2 1 if — higher vocational school
edu univer 1 if — university
urban low 1 if respondent lives in a less urbanized area
urban high 1 if — more urbanized area
urban middle 1 if — an intermediate urban character
occup empl 1 is respondent has an (unpaid) job
occup pension 1 if — is retired or ≥ 65 years
occup indep 1 if — works as independent entrepreneur or in a family ﬁrm
occup nowork 1 if — has no occupation (incl. students)
position head 1 if respondent is head of the household
partner 1 if head of household has a partner (married or unmarried)
party nochr 1 if respondent votes for a non-Christian national political party
party christ 1 if — Christian national political party
party other 1 if — local party or does not vote
30Table 9: List of binary vignette variables with explanation
vign wage 1 if vignette person (vp) has a high wage
vign female 1 if vp is a woman
vign 27y 1 if vp is 27 years old
vign 43y 1 if vp is 43 years old
vign 55y 1 if vp is 55 years old
vign freq 1 if small crime has been committed more often before
vign catch 1 if the probability of getting caught is 50% (0 if very small)
vign distance 1 if the travel distance is 20 minutes (0 if 5 minutes)
vign boss 1 if the boss of the vp behaves correctly
vign entrepr 1 if the vp is an independent entrepreneur
vign wage hi 1 if vp receives substantial wage for type of work, given vign wage = 1
vign wage us 1 if vp receives usual wage for type of work, given vign wage = 0
31